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Security Implementation of Mission Control System for ESTCube-1 Satellite 
Abstract: 
ESTCube-1 is Estonia’s first satellite project built by university students. ESTCube-1 Mission 
Control System (MCS) software is also developed as part of this educational project. Mission 
Control System is a modular system, comprised of various components in multiple servers, of 
which most of them are running on default or basic security configuration settings and in some 
cases, data is not protected well enough in the present state. Some of the components 
communicate over unsecured network thereby making its data vulnerable. As this thesis title 
“Security Implementation of Mission Control System for ESTCube-1 Satellite” implies, there is 
need for a systematic approach about the entire data security of the mission and my aim is to 
improve the security of ESTCube-1 Mission Control System. 
The following steps are taken in the thesis: establish a good understanding ESTCube-1 MCS 
architecture, understand the possibilities of security configurations of all used technologies, 
analyse the effect of a possible selection of security methods, implement the chosen solutions in 
a sandbox environment, test and verify the operating of the complete MCS with the implemented 
solution.  
The results show security implementations done on the various components allow the connection 
between components are secure and data in motion are encrypted. Access to the data at rest are 
restricted, some are encrypted and only privileged users can gain access. Mission Control System 
accessibility over the Internet is more secure and access to the hardware tightened. 
In conclusion, the Mission Control System can certainly be accessed via the Internet securely as 
long as the user has valid certificates. Other access means are through other means like VPN and 
SSH Tunnelling. The original system configuration providedESTCube-1 MCS with just adequate 
security that would be befitting for a production environment, with the security solution found in 
current thesis, the system could be elevated for enterprise-level usage. 
Keywords: ESTCube-1, Mission Control System, CubeSat, Hummingbird, Atlassian Crowd, 
Mongodb, Oracle 11g, Apache ActiveMQ, Jetty Web Server 
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Satelliidi ESTCube-1 missioonijuhtimissüsteemi turvalisuse parendamine 
Lühikokkuvõte 
ESTCube-1 on Eesti esimene satelliit ja ühtlasi onta ehitatud tervenisti üliõpilaste poolt. 
ESTCube-1 paljudestallsüsteemidest on üks osa missioonijuhtimissüsteemist (ingl. k.Mission 
Control System- MCS). Missioonijuhtimise tarkvara on modulaarne, moodulid võivad asuda 
erinevates serverites. Praeguses seadistusestöötab enamik moodulitest vaikimisi 
konfiguratsiooniseadetes ja mõnel juhul ei ole andmed piisavalt kaitstud – näiteks suhtlevad osad 
komponendidilma turvalise võrguühenduseta. Käesoleva töö eesmärk on süstemaatiliselt 
läheneda missioonijuhtimise süsteemi kui terviku turvalisusele ja leida lahendus senisest 
paremini turvatud süsteemi seadistamiseks. 
Töö koosneb järgnevatest sammudest:kirjeldada ESTCube-1 missioonijuhtimissüsteemi 
arhitektuuri, analüüsida kõikide süsteemi moodulite turvalahenduste võimalusi, rakendada leitud 
terviklahendus missioonijuhtimissüsteemi turvalahendustetestkeskkonnas, katsetadaja 
kontrollida süsteemi tööd uues seadistuses. 
Töös valitud lahendus võimaldab turvalisiühendusi erinevate moodulite vahel ja krüpteerib 
salvestatud andmed. Andmetele juurdepääsu saab piirata ka kasutajapõhiselt. 
Kokkuvõttes võib missioonijuhtimissüsteemi tarkvara panna tööle avatud ligipääsuga üle 
Interneti. Seni kasutatud lahendus tugines VPN ja SSH tunnelitele, mis on küll sobiliksüsteemi 
arenduseks, aga käesolev lahendus võimaldab süsteemile turvalise ligipääsu satelliidi 
opereerimise igapäevatöös. 
 
Võtmesõnad: ESTCube-1, Mission Control System, CubeSat, Hummingbird, Atlassian Crowd, 
Mongodb, Oracle 11g, Apache ActiveMQ, Jetty Web Server 
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LUKS   -Linux Unified Key Setup 
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SDC  -Space Data Chain 
SDR  -Software-Defined Radio 
SPNEGO -Simple and Protected GSSAPI Negotiation 
SSL  -Secure Socket Layer 
SSO   -Secure Single Sign-on 
TC  -Telecommand 
TCP  -Transmission Control Protocol 
TCPS  -Transmission Control Protocol Secure 
TM  -Telemetry 
TNC  -Terminal Node Controller 
UDP   -User Datagram Protocol 
USB  -Universal Serial Bus 
VPN  -Virtual Private Network 
WAR   -Web Application Archive 
XML  -Extensible Markup Language 
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Introduction 
ESTCube-1 is Estonia’s first satellite, which is a CubeSat built entirely by students. ESTCube-1 
was launched in May 2013. Since the satellite was built by students for educational purpose, it 
provides an avenue for Space Engineering students (and other students as well) to get good 
education on Space Technology, also paves the way for other Space projects in future. 
There are not a lot of information on security on Mission Control Systems for these kind of 
satellites. Nonetheless, caution is taken when dealing security of data in transit or who has 
privilege to access some resources[1]. Security solutions of Mission Control System are either 
powered by third party software, they are not robust enough or are being operated within an 
internal network and not exposed to the Internet, this would be the reason why there is lack of 
information in this area. 
ESTCube-1 project is comprised of many sub-systems and components, some of which are 
located in different physical locations. This project contains two sub-systems (Ground Station 
and Mission Control System) that have physically components located in different places and 
they are connected to each other via some form of communication protocols. Mission Control 
System (MCS) is a subsystem in ESTCube-1 that handles the Mission Control of the satellite 
ESTCube-1. MCS is composed of different ready-made components and some own-developed 
ones as well; these makeup the entire system. There exists some instructions for setting up some 
parts of the system, but they have not been analysed as a whole to the level of configuration for 
an enterprise system whereby all the components are connected and working together. 
Hummingbird
1
 is an open-source platform for building, monitory and controlling both satellites 
and ground stations. Hummingbird provides framework on which Mission Control System 
                                                 
 
 
1
http://www.hbird.de/ 
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(MCS) is built, it is specifically designed for ESTCube-1 mission with Technical support from 
CGI Groups.  
This research topic “Security Implementation of Mission Control System for ESTCube-1 
Satellite” is very important to the ESTCube-1 project because of its potentiality to change the 
security status of the Mission Control System of now and in future. Like every other projects, be 
it hardware or software, there are security concerns that must be addressed in order to get a safe, 
secure, confidential system; not to forget its integrity. Most of MCS components are using 
default security setting or at most basic security settings for its operation. The main problem 
MCS is facing is the lack of adequate security solutions for its components that would ensure the 
overall security of system when tackled from the Tartu University’s network and from the 
Internet. 
The solutions to these problems can be successfully achieved in this thesis by making sure these 
following steps are accomplished: 
 Understand the whole system's architecture 
 Check for available security solution possibilities for these technologies  
 Analyse the different security solution options available  
 Implementation of the chosen security solutions in a MCS test environment 
 Test and verify the solution in the MCS test environment 
ESTCube-1 project involves students from various fields of study working on different parts of 
the project. The novelty of this project for the field of Computer Sciences in general is the 
integration of Software Development Technology with Space technology, which delivers a 
robust system. Since some of the activities are software related, the field of Computer Sciences 
(Software Engineering) would be of great use relating to software security issues in this project, 
also the fact that this system as a whole could make up for an Enterprise-Level system. 
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1 ESTCube-1 Architecture 
1.1 Components diagram 
The architecture for ESTCube-1’s Mission Control System comprises of many components from 
different servers in different locations (logical, physical and geographic). Figure 1.1 below 
shows all the components’ interconnectivity, sub-systems and the overall systems. The figure 
reveals sub-systems namely: Ground Station hardware, Ground Station Software, Back-End, 
Front-End, Data Storage, etc. and their components. 
 
 
Figure 1.1.Mission Control Software architecture for ESTCube-1 showing the communication 
between various subsystems and components, the subsystems includes Ground Station hardware, 
Ground Station Software, Back-End, Front-End, Data Storage, Data Archiver and so on. 
1.2 Components in University network 
Currently, MCS components are located in the University of Tartu’s internal network. The figure 
below depicts the current structure for the components under the umbrella of Tartu University’s 
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secured network. Figure 1.2 depicts the whole system and components inside Tartu University 
internal network. 
 
Figure 1.2. Showing components diagram inside Tartu University’s internal network with the 
flow of transmission running from right to left. 
1.3 Components over the Internet 
Figure 1.3 shows MCS without the internal network of Tartu University and now connected to 
the Internet, with most components communicating over the Internet. For the whole system to 
function properly in this new network (the Internet), it has to be configured securely using SSL 
configuration for particular components. The figure below shows red ovals as the components 
that must be secured in order for the system to use the connectivity of the Internet. 
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Figure 1.3. Components diagram having red ovals on them are the important components that 
security implementations must be carried out on. 
1.4 Mission Control System Architecture 
This is a simplified view of the entire ESTCube-1 architectural system showing the sub-sections 
of the project, components and connectivity, as well as the end-users. The Satellite (ESTCube-1) 
communicates with the Ground Stations over an amateur radio protocol called AX.25; Ground 
Station communicates with the Back-End components over the internet; the Back-End then 
communicates with the End-User(Browser) via the internet as well. 
12 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. System Architecture revealing the Satellite, Ground Stations, Control Centre 
comprising of databases, webserver and others, and finally the End-User. The red ovals identify 
the components that must be secured. 
1.5 How Mission Control System works 
The current state of MCS is represented in the figure below showing how the components are 
connected. In Figure 1.5 ESTCube-1 sends packets to the Ground station via AX.25 protocol, 
which is then sent to TNC and SDR hardware after that TNC communicates this to TNC driver 
via Serial connection, TNC driver sends the packets to the Archiver via AMQ and they are later 
stored in the Oracle database. From the SDC to AMQ, then to WebServer via TM and finally to 
GUI (downlink). Up-link from GUI to the WebServer, from Webserver to AMQ via TC, from 
here to the SDC and then to TNS driver and to TNS and finally to ESTCube-1. The SDR gets 
packets to the SDR driver using USB, TCP, Serial, the SDR driver then sends packets to AMQ, 
AMQ sends to Archiver via TCP and Archiver to Oracle database (downlink). Then from SDC to 
AMQ, then to WebServer via TM and finally to GUI (downlink). For up-link- from GUI to the 
WebServer, from Webserver to AMQ via TC, from SDC to SDR driver, from there to SDR and 
finally to ESTCube-1.  
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Figure 1.5. View of how packets are moving from and to ESTCube-1 as well as the 
communication protocols. 
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2 Available security solutions possibilities 
2.1. ActiveMQ 
ActiveMQ is an open source message broker with JMS (Java Message Service) client support 
designed by Apache. ActiveMQ, which is a Message Oriented Middleware (MOM) was 
designed for sending messages between two or more components in the same application or 
different applications[2]. ActiveMQ broker is a Publish-Subscribe messaging negotiator that 
publishes messages regardless of the subscriber and the subscriber receives messages regardless 
of the publisher and all these are done in classes. 
After installation of ActiveMQ, it started-off with the default configuration settings, which has 
no security configurations in place. So with these default settings in place ActiveMQ is not 
secured a bit; the broker, users and other parts that connects to ActiveMQ must be securely 
configured. 
2.1.1 Authentication 
Security in ActiveMQ are mainly implemented as plug-ins. The plug-ins were made to be easier 
to customize and configure through the <plugin> element in the XML configuration file of 
ActiveMQ. There are two authentication plug-ins available to users in ActiveMQ: 
 Simple authentication plug-in - This method allows the credentials to be taken directly 
from ActiveMQ’s XML configuration file or from a properties file. This is the easiest 
way of securing a broker, since all the authentication credentials are in the XML 
configuration file of the brokers. ActiveMQ provides the simple authentication plug-in as 
a functionality that is part of its distribution. Figure 2.1.1A shows simple authentication 
plug-in granting three users access to ActiveMQ. The users have usernames and 
passwords for the authentication. The attribute named “groups” determines what category 
the users are in respect to the authorization. 
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Figure2.1.1A. Example of a simple authentication plug-in in ActiveMQ. 
 JAAS authentication plug-in - This method uses JAAS API (Java Authentication and 
Authorization Service Java Authentication and Authorization Service Application Service 
Interface) implementation and it produces a more powerful, customizable authentication 
solution. ActiveMQ uses the same techniques for verifying user’s credentials through a 
pluggable authentication API. The javax.security.auth.spi.LoginModule interface and 
changing of ActiveMQ configuration settings are all needed for the implementation of 
this authentication method. Out of the box, ActiveMQ is equipped with modules that can 
authenticate users by the property files, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificates and 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). Figure 2.1.1B shows the file contents of 
JAAS module that is used to configure users and groups, which ActiveMQ will be able to 
recognize with PropertiesLoginModulein placewith the activemq-domain being very 
important here as well as the PropertiesLoginModule.  
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Figure 2.1.1B. JAAS login module for configuration of users and groups that ActiveMQ could 
recognize with PropertiesLoginModuleandactivemq-domain. 
2.1.2 Authorization 
Authorization is one more layer of security on top of authentication. This is level of control that 
gives a client the authority to access resources after the user has been authenticated. This is only 
granted to the client with that permission. Authorization for ActiveMQ has two levels, which 
have more control than the simple authentication: Operational-level authorization and message-
level authorization. 
 Operation-level authorization - Operation-level authorization or user-level operation 
consists of three main elements: read-gets messages from the JMS destination; write-
sends messages to the JMS destination; admin-administers the JMS destination; controls 
how operations are performed. ActiveMQ XML configuration file makes it easier to add 
operations’ authorization to some destinations. Figure 2.1.2A defines JAAS authorization 
plug-in, which points to the activemq-domain configuration. The destination to be 
secured is firstly defined when configuring the map authorization entries. The 
configuration is done in the topic attribute or the queue attribute. The second step is to 
declare which usersand or groups have the permission in that destination. The figure 
below shows the topics “>” can be fully accessed by the admins, the topic “users.>” can 
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be accessed by users and the topic “guest.>” can be accessed by guests, users. The 
operations and their descriptions are as follows: read- browse and consume from 
destination, write- send messages to destination, admin- creates destination if not existing 
and controls the creation of new destination in the topic/queue hierarchy. 
 
 
Figure 2.1.2A. JAAS authorization plug-in pointing to the activemq-domain configuration with 
read, write and admin operations. 
 Message-level authorization - Message-level authorization provides means of granting 
access to some messages in the destination. If the host and the broker are running on the 
same host then it allow application to consume messages. For this to happen, an interface 
that shows the implementation should be created and it should be a simple interface that 
defines a method isAllowedToConsume(). The method can access the message and 
consumption connection as well. The class and package should be compiled to a .jar file 
and placed in {ACTIVEMQ_HOME}/lib/ directory for use. Then, the policy should be 
configured so that it can create the AuthorizationPolicy instance class in the ActiveMQ 
XML configuration file. When the broker starts, the AuthorizationPolicy class instance is 
started in the XML element <messagesAuthorizationPolicy>. 
2.1.3 Build a custom security plug-in 
Since ActiveMQ plug-in API is very flexible, thus allowing easier integration with other third 
party plug-ins. A class BrokerFilter in ActiveMQ makes it possible to intercept operation in the 
broker-level. Adding some custom functions can be done by extending the class BrokerFilter and 
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overriding a method for that operation. Implementation of a custom security handling plug-in 
and Implementation of JAAS login module are available custom options. 
To implement custom plug-in, a class called IPAuthenticationBroker must be created to override 
the BrokerFilter.addConnection() method thereby limiting connection access to the broker on the 
IP-address. A check if the IP address can be granted access to connect or not is done when the 
method is implemented. Figure 2.1.3A shows the custom implementation of the broker. The 
method shown below checks if the IP addresses have the right to access the broker and thus is 
allowed to be connected but if it does not then an exception is thrown as shown in the red 
rectangle below. Once the plug-in has been implemented, then configuration and installation of 
the ActiveMQ broker process in order for the plug-in to work takes place. A custom 
implementation plug-in where a custom class instance is created and it returns the new broker for 
the next plug-in.  
 
Figure 2.1.3A. Custom implementation of a broker extending the class BrokerFilter.A method 
for checking if the IP addresses have the right to access the broker is shown in the red rectangle. 
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2.1.4 Certificate-based security 
Certificate-based security solution uses underlying technologies needed for its execution. 
 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) that sends and receives data packets but does not 
guarantee data packet’s order-ness and data might have duplicates when they arrive. 
Another characteristic is that it does not guarantee the data packet delivery since it uses 
connectionless protocol.  
 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sends and receives data in a stream-oriented 
manner with the data packet order-ness guaranteed no duplicates of data and guarantees 
reliability of packet delivery with no packet lost on the way due to its use of active 
reliable connection. 
This leads us to Secured Socket Layer protocol (SSL), a secure protocol designed for transiting 
encrypted data over protocol like the TCP network. SSL protocol was designed to make use of a 
public key and a private key so that the communication channel would be secure. ActiveMQ 
provides an SSL transport connector that would ensure secure communication between the client 
and the broker over the TCP network. For SSL to work, the keys and certificates to be used must 
be configured appropriately.  
 
 
Figure 2.1.4. UDP, TCP and SSL transport connectors configuration is shown, in which 
ActiveMQ is set to use secure SSL connection over TCP. 
This brings us to the Certificate-based security for securing the broker in ActiveMQ. It works by 
using certificates over SSL transport and using necessary plug-ins to secure the broker. This can 
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also be configured to grant different access rights to clients according to their certificates. Both 
the keystores(stores your private certificates and their private keys) and the truststores(stores the 
certificates of other trusted applications) should be created and made available. 
2.2 Jetty Web Server 
Jetty a Java-based open source project that provides HTTP server, HTTP client and java.servlet 
container[3]. Jetty offer machine-to-machine communication for large framework of software. 
The default Jetty installation comes without any security configuration implemented, so upon 
first starting it uses the default settings. The rest of this section will be about the important parts 
to be secured like the communication, connection and authentication, as well as the available 
solutions there are for Jetty. 
2.2.1 SSL configuration 
By default, Jetty web server comes with standard configurations like the use of http default base 
directory for managing multiple instances but with the ability to create more bases to handle 
more installations. To ensure the server’s connection is secured, some modules will be added to 
the configuration file. The security configuration properties are in the start.ini file, while the 
others are located in http.mod, https.mod and ssl.mod files.  
Firstly, a new base directory should be created for use and the SSL, HTTP, and WEBAPP 
DEPLOYMENT modules will be added to the start file in that base directory. Then the 
webserver’s .WAR (Web Application Archive) file should be placed in the webapps/ folder of the 
base directory (my-base in this case). Next, the web application’s keystore is copied and placed 
in the ect/ folder of the base directory. The start.ini file is then edited to allow the SSL settings 
by changing this –module=ssl, defining a secure port for redirection jetty.secure.port=8443, 
setting up the keystore and 
truststorejetty.keystore=etc/keystoreandjetty.truststore=etc/keystorerespectively. The default 
password should then be changed. Set the –module=server parameter for the initialization of the 
module server, the –module=http and –module=deploy should be set also. When all these 
changes has be done, Jetty could be started. 
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Alternatively, starting a new module can been done directly from the shell by adding the module 
to the command when starting Jetty: java -jar ../jetty-distribution/start.jar --add-to-start=https 
2.2.2 Authentication and Authorization (Security Realms) 
Authentication in Jetty can be done in several ways called standard authentication mechanism, 
they are: Basic, Digest, Form, Client-Cert; and also using plug-ins mechanisms like JASPI or 
SPNEGO. Figure 2.2.2 below shows the standard authentication mechanisms in red rectangles. 
The authentication mechanism is done by declaring the <login-config> element in the web.xml 
descriptor or annotator files. The <login-config> element in the web.xml file is compared to the 
realm name in the jetty xml configuration file. The LoginService possesses unique name, each 
user is given their own authentication information and associated roles. A LoginService in Jetty 
performs the authentication by granting each user with authenticated information access into the 
webapp. This protection could be done specifically for one webapp or for many webapps. Jetty 
supports configuration of different types of authentication mechanism: HashLoginService, 
JDBCLoginServic, DataSourceLoginService, JAASLoginService and SpnegoLoginService.  
Authorization comes into play after the LoginService does the authentication and access request 
to certain resources are made. When a request for resources is made, the LoginService then 
checks to see if the user has the permission to access that resource based on the granted role. 
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Figure 2.2.2. Standard authentication mechanisms showing the Basic, Digest and Form types in 
red rectangles with their matching realm names. 
2.2.3 Limiting Form Content configuration 
Jetty process form contents are sent to the server in a map that webapps uses. If a very large 
amount of these form contents or form keys is sent to the server, it could cripple the server 
because the server would have to utilize large amount of memory and CPU power, which will 
later lead to a shutdown of the system. To avoid this, a limit should be set on the amount of 
contents it can accept as shown in Figure 2.2.3. Form-Content limits configuration for a single 
webapp and server showing its MaxFormContentSizeand MaxFormKeys attributes. Limits are set 
to indicate the intended allowed amount. These are handled with methods: 
ContextHandler.setMaxFormContentSize(intmaxSizeInBytes;); and 
ContextHandler.setMaxFormKeys(intformKeys); 
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Figure 2.2.3. Form content limits configuration for a single webapp and server with 
MaxFormContentSizeand MaxFormKeys attributes. 
2.2.4 Secure password obfuscation 
Passwords are used for securing most systems and are stored as plain text, 
obfuscated,checksummed or encrypted according to the security needs. Obfuscation methods 
make it possible for the system to retrieve the password from the keystore when needed, while 
being protected from casual viewing. When a password is entered into the system, it is compared 
with the stored password and the result determines whether an authentication will be granted or 
not. 
Various secured passwords are generated as seen in the Figure 2.2.4 below. The blue rectangle 
shows a user called “me” and accompanying password “blah” in red rectangle, which is in a 
plain text format. It’s then encrypted to produce what is in the big red rectangle, which are the 
three different secured password types (OBF, MD5,CRYPT) for the same plain text password. 
The password can be copied and pasted in Jetty xml file instead of plain text passwords. The 
prefixes OBF:, MD5: and CRYPT: must be copied as well before usage.  
 
Figure 2.2.4. Secure password generation for a plain text password format with three formats to 
choose from (OBF, MD5,CRYPT). 
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2.2.5 JAAS configuration 
JAAS plug-in is used for both Authentication and Authorization, a java version of Pluggable 
Authentication Module (PAM) framework is implemented by JAAS. With PAM framework 
JAAS can easily do new authentication plug-ins or updates authentication plug-ins without 
disrupting the application itself. Using JAAS in Jetty requires the 
org.eclipse.jetty.jaas.JAASLoginService to be declared and a jaas-login module configuration 
file should be created, and must be specified in the Jetty command. Steps to get this done:  
 A JAASLoginService in web.xml should be configured to match the name of the realm  
 A matching JAASLoginService with the same name as the one in previous step should be 
created 
 Setup LoginModule in configuration file, the application name should be the same name 
used in the JAASLoginService 
 Jetty with support for jaas should be called by adding the jaas-related jars to Jetty 
container’s classpath and setting the system properties java.security.auth.login.config. 
The default JAASLoginService works fine and it is flexible enough to allow other 
configuration settings. 
2.2.6 Spnego configuration support 
The Spnego (Simple and Protected GSSAPI Negotiation) mechanism allows Windows or Active 
Directory based network users to be authenticated. This type of authentication and authorization 
support is done through Java JDK 6 and above. This is a very sensitive and fragile setup to use 
because it requires all configuration to be precise or it will not work. Good knowledge of 
Windows network and Active Domain Controller is required to configure, test and maintain the 
services for its users. Figure 2.2.6 shows Spnego configuration commands (a) and (b) for running 
and debugging respectively, as well as enabling Spnego authentication using role name as seen 
in the red rectangle.  
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Figure 2.2.6A. Commands needed for the configuration and debugging of Spnego authentication 
for Jetty. Enabling Spnego authentication using a role name is shown with the red rectangle. 
Enabling Spnego authentication in a webapp requires the role-name of the network to be changed 
to fit the corresponding one as shown below in Figure 2.2.6B. For the webapp to utilize this 
mechanism, a UserRealm must be created either by programming or in jetty.xml or in the context 
file. Amongst other important configuration files that comes with Jetty distribution are some 
Spnego configuration files: spnego.properties (configures user realm with runtime properties), 
krb5.ini (configures kerberos setup) and spnego.conf (configures the connection between gssapi 
and kerberos).  
 
Figure 2.2.6B. Enabling Spnego authentication using the role-name. 
2.3 Mongodb 
Mongodb is a NoSQL document-oriented database system that uses an open data format called 
Binary-JSON (BSON) which is based-off JSON to store data[4]. Mongodb like other NoSQL 
databases out there by default is without security password protection; this means anyone can 
access the database. Since security was not the main goal in mind when designing this database, 
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it lacks in the security department[5]. In order to have a secure database, the default settings must 
be changed ranging from the network connection using SSL to the database to the encryption of 
stored data in the database.  
2.3.1 SSL configuration 
SSL support for Mongodb allows encrypted connection to mongod instances. The default 
Mongodb distribution does not ship with SSL support but can be configured to allow that locally 
by using--ssl option to the database from the command line. SSL configuration for mongod and 
mongos instances that requires a client’s certificate must have mongo shell started with --ssl and 
–sslPEMKeyFileand the .pem file that holds the certificate and keys needed for SSL connection 
to occur[6]. 
2.3.2 Access control 
Mongodb comes equipped with access control capabilities, which by default is installed in the 
admin database, and it restricts the right to change or modify the structure of Mongodb. 
Mongodb supports authentication but by default it does not come with any, which make it easy 
for anyone with access to the network connection to gain access and issue commands[4]. 
The Authentication Mongodb offers is on a database level only, it does not apply to the whole 
database. Authentication for Mongodb is disabled by default. Users who are “superusers” have 
the userAdmin or userAdminAnyDatabase roles that enables them to create, modify and grant 
privileges to themselves, as well as other users. To enable the authentication, Mongodb has to 
start with this command (--auth) attached to it or set the command after Mongodb has started 
with the commands shown in Figure 2.3.2A. In Figure 2.3.2B, the user being authenticated was 
successful therefore the appearance of the number 1, otherwise it would be 0. 
 
Figure 2.3.2A. Authentication activation for a database after starting, the setParameter telling the 
database not to enable localhostbypass authentication. 
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Figure 2.3.2B. A user being authenticated, the number 1 indicates a successful authentication. 
Authorization is done based on role privilege once the user has been authenticated, user can then 
gain access to some information. Figure 2.3.2C shows how a user is created: firstly, the admin 
user is called and then user’s credentials are created. Notice the password changed, it was 
encrypted with MD5 hash and it is more secured. The Figure 2.3.2D below shows that the 
authenticated users do have the authority to perform these certain tasks. Mongodb authenticates 
users by “roles” privileges that are defined when a user is created or assigned to the user 
afterwards.  
 
Figure 2.3.2C. Creating a new user SuperUser with userAdminAnyDatabse role and encrypting 
the password with MD5 hash. 
 
Figure 2.3.2D. Authorized users admin and jon are granted access to the resource “show 
collections”. 
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2.3.3 Kerberos authentication for Mongodb 
Kerberos authentication is a standard authentication protocol that is supported by Mongodb for 
large systems. Kerberos authentication works by configuring the mongod and mongos instances 
of Mongodb with their valid keytab files respectively. Mongodb support for Kerberos  
Authentication exists for both Linux and Windows OS and are configured almost in the same 
manner. The configuration procedures go: start the mongod.exe without Kerberos support, then 
later connect (with privileges that can create a user) mongod.exe instance via mongo.exe. Next 
add the Kerberos principals (allows request for external source to authenticate) to the Mongodb 
for every user that would be authenticated. After that, the mongo.exe should be restarted with the 
Kerberos support this time around, making sure the parameter authenticationMechanisms is set 
to GSSAPI. Lastly, connect mongo.exe shell client to mongod.exe and then authenticate 
externally. 
2.3.4 Network security 
Avoiding the possibility of access to the database through the Internet is a good step to securing 
Mongodb. Access to Mongodb by default is allowed through all available network interfaces. 
This poses a possible threat to the Mongodb security. This could be rectified by limiting network 
access to the programs (mongod and mongos) via configurations settings.  
 VPN- Virtual Private Network provides a secure tunnel connection over network with 
encryption. It (VPN) provides different choices of encryption protocols that offers 
certificate validation and authentication. 
 Port- Mongodb comes with a default listening port 27017 for all running mongod and 
mongos instances. Although changing the port does not fully protect Mongodb, however 
it makes it easier to filter connections to the Mongodb instances and limiting access from 
unknown/untrusted clients. 
 Firewall- Firewalls prevent or limit hosts access to a system. Mongodb supports Firewall 
on both Windows and Linux systems. Windows Server’s netshis responsible for 
managing Windows’ Firewall. Linux systems use the netfilter firewall to filter traffic to 
the ports using iptables interface for access. It is safe to use these security options for 
securing Mongodb. 
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 Bind-ip- This configuration setting allows the limitation of network interfaces from 
which both mongod and mongos instances listens for incoming connections. Limiting the 
amount of incoming connections to listen to is done by specifying the IP addresses with 
commas separating them, while the programs are running. Both mongod –blind_ip and 
mongos –bind_ip activates this option.  
 NoHttpInterface- This configuration settings option makes it possible to disable the 
default status page for “home” that is usually in port 27017. Changing this setting would 
make it impossible to view the read-only status interface. To enable that, run these 
commands: mongod – nohttpinterface and mongos –nohttpinterface. 
 Rest- Mongodb’smongod by default disables the rest setting which is responsible for the 
administrative rest interface. Activating this option will make the read-only status 
interface interactive. Authentication for this interactive rest interface is not supported, so 
it is not really secured therefore access to this interface should be limited to only 
known/trusted clients. Activation is done with mongod –rest in the command line. 
2.3.5 Data encryption 
A scenario where all other forms of security fails and an attacker gains access into the database 
and the stored data are encrypted. The data would thereby be useless to the intruder or simply 
difficult to decrypt. A full database encryption for Mongodb is not available yet but there are 
some steps to take to ensure some level of encryption. Encryption of selective (sensitive) stored 
data can be done on the application layer. Third party encryption solutions exists for this 
problem, amongst them are MongoDirector.com encryption solution, Gazzang and LUKS (Linux 
Unified Key Setup). For the encryption of moving data, SSL is most highly recommended. 
2.3.6. Audit system activities 
Auditing for Mongodb is supported but only in the MongoDB Enterprise edition. The auditing 
involves the tracking and writing events of all mongod server and mongo router processes to the 
console, a syslog, a JSON file and BSON file. The log messages can then be viewed to see who 
accessed what and what operations were done and so on. All auditable operations are recorded 
by default but with the help of a built-in filter option, the events to be recorded could be selected 
or filtered. 
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2.4 Oracle database 
Oracle 11g is an object-oriented relational database system or simply ORDBMS for storing data. 
Oracle stores data in tablespaces logically in the form of datafiles. Oracle uses the standard SQL 
for storing, retrieving and manipulating of data[7]. Oracle database concerns itself with security, 
so there are some available security solutions already in place after installation. Although these 
are the basic security possibilities, they are not too bad for a beginning. More security solutions 
will be added to the already present ones to make the database more secure. Amongst them 
would be enhancing of security settings, security configuration settings and many more. 
2.4.1 Enhance security settings 
While it is advisable to have Oracle database installed and ran in a safe environment with some 
protections or behind firewall for security, some actions could be performed to make the 
database more secure. 
 By default Oracle installations come with some passwords for both users and 
administrators, they should be changed. When left with default passwords, anyone with 
access to the OS can simply gain access to the database through the sysdba or system 
users accounts who have administrative privileges and can do many things. Figure 2.4.1 
shows sysdba connecting to the database without username and password. 
 
Figure 2.4.1. Connecting to the database without username and password, altering the user’s 
password to remove it from its default state. 
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 Privileges are very powerful and should be granted carefully. If a user with administrative 
rights to perform tasks, like create tables,create users and so on, should a grant a privilege 
to a new user, the new user with the privileges could also grant that administrative right 
to other users. This is dangerous because it makes it easy to abuse this right. Privileges 
should be monitored from time to time. 
 During a fresh installation of Oracle database, many components come bundled in the 
package. Oracle database configuration assistant has two installation options: Typical and 
Custom. The custom option should be picked so that unwanted components could be 
unselected and needed ones are installed. For example, the spatial feature (Spatial 
MDSYS schema), if installed and not properly managed could lead to vulnerabilities that 
are unknown to the administrator[8]. Therefore, if a component is not really needed, its 
installation should not be necessary. 
2.4.2 Security updates installation 
Security updates are great at fixing security loopholes and most time enhances the security of 
that system. Oracle offers security updates as well, which tackles the security issues that might 
be available. Security updates are usually offered to registered members with account on this 
link: metalink.oracle.com. Next is the security updates should be from the Operating Systems on 
which Oracle database runs. Most Operating Systems if not all, frequently or occasionally offer 
security updates to their users to patch any security problems that were discovered, some are 
done automatically and others manually. 
2.4.3 Data encryption 
Oracle supports encryption to some extent using Transparent Data Encryption (TDE), which is a 
file level encryption solution for data at rest on hard drives and backup media. In Oracle, this 
could be enabled through the Advanced Security Option. TDE supports encryption for both 
columns and tablespaces, so encryption could be done on the table’s column or an entire 
tablespace. If data is entered into an encrypted column or tablespace, TDE automatically 
encrypts the data and when data is queried from the encrypted column or tablespace it decrypts it 
before sending it out. 
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2.4.4 OS authentication bypass 
A user gains access to the Oracle database without any form of authentication by Oracle because 
the authentication was done in the OS level. Although, it might not be considered dangerous to 
some extent if the database is behind a firewall but it is not a safe practice because anyone with 
access to the machine automatically have access to the database as shown in Figure 2.4.1 above.  
2.4.5 Security configuration enhancement 
Password parameters management is a vital part of security for Oracle database system. Looking 
at the dba_profiles, some resources’ limits are unlimited, these are somewhat risky to the 
database. Figure 2.4.5 shows various default profiles and their limits, including password 
parameters’ management in the dba_profiles. 
 Failed_login_attempts - the amount to failed attempts login before the account is locked 
 Password_life_time - the amount in day/s a password could be used for authentication 
before it expires 
 Password_reuse_time - the password can be used for the amount of day for authentication 
 Password_reuse_max - the amount of times a password must be changed before using the 
original one 
 Password_verify_function - the passwords’ complexity will be verified to ensure it is not 
weak. A free program Oracle Password Checker (Cracker) can check for weak passwords 
 Password_lock_time - the account would be locked in day/s after several failed logins. If 
not changed, it remains in its default day of 1. 
 Password_grace_time - the amount of day/s the account will be locked for after the 
password expires. 
The profiles can be changed with a command like this: alter profile default 
limitpassword_life_time 100; 
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Figure 2.4.5. The default profiles, limits and the password parameters management in 
dba_profiles. 
2.4.6 Network security 
The network security here would include Oracle SSL configuration, Listener’s configuration and 
closing of unused or unnecessarily open ports that may connect to the database.  
 Oracle network security configuration for the SSL protocol ensures the security of data 
on transmission over network. SSL ensures data integrity, confidentiality, encrypts data 
and provides authentication for access using the Oracle Internet Directory’s message 
digest. In Oracle environment SSL components are Certificates authentication, 
Certificates and Wallets. The SSL support uses Certificates that are stored in the Wallet 
and the certificates are taken from the Wallet when needed for Authentication. SSL 
works by going through tnsname.ora configuration file, checks the listener.ora file for 
the TCPS protocol and then connect through a secure port[9].  
 The listener.ora configuration file consist of an Oracle created EXTROC entry, which 
make it possible for making external procedural calls from the database. If the database 
does not make any of these external procedural calls, for security reasons it is advisable 
to remove it from the listener.ora file (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = IPC)(KEY = 
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EXTPROC1521)). Another option for securing the listener is by setting an administrative 
restriction on the listener, adding ADMIN_RESTRICTIONS_LISTENER_<non-default-
listener-name>=ON would make users with “write” permission unable to carry out 
changes to the listener.ora file. Restricting IP addresses that can gain access to the 
database will provide a layer of protection. In a scenario where other protections are 
bypassed, this can protect the database. Add these commands (tcp.validnode_checking = 
ON and tcp.invited_nodes = (hostname1, hostname2, hostnameN) to sqlnet.ora file to set 
the permitted IP addresses. All these files could be found in this path 
~dbhome_1\NETWORK\ADMIN[9].Benefits of securing the Listener includes 
avoiding:1. Stopping the listener and creating large file that consumes CPU and disks 
resources thereby causing Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. 2. Writing to the file system 
through the listener. 3. Running codes called from the database or at the OS level. 4. 
Extracting the database’s configuration information for further use[10]. 
 All unused ports that could communicate with the database which are not in use should 
be closed or blocked. Leaving ports that are not in use open could lead to a point of entry 
for attackers. View and close available port using the Command line or Fusion 
Middleware Control[9].  
2.5 Crowd 
Atlassian Crowd is a management tool that allows secure single sign-on into many web apps for 
user. Crowd’s SSO product is designed to integrate into third party applications and systems[11]. 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
2
 is an open, simpler version of the industrial 
standard X.500 protocol
3
, which is used for accessing information directories. It actually 
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3
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supports TCP/IP and it can be used in different types of servers. LDAP is mostly used for single 
sign on that allow a user to utilize one password for many services[12]. 
2.5.1 Authentication and Authorization 
Authentication is verifying a user identity to confirm who they are and this is usually done 
typically by using a username and password. Authentication could also be done by connecting 
to an LDAP sever, and then bind the connection to the application user. The DN (distinguishing 
name) of the user to be authenticated should be searched for, making sure the user exists or is 
valid and finally bind the connection to the DM user and use the supplied password[13].  
Authorization is done when attributes of the user’s account are searched and re-bound as the 
application user, then checks for the user and requests attributes showing if user is 
authorized[13]. Authorization mostly come in the form of belonging to groups, having roles and 
permissions 
Figure 2.5.1 shows a successfully authenticated user with through the LDAP’s “Authentication 
Test” login page. 
 
Figure 2.5.1 show a successfully authenticated user with through the LDAP’s Authentication 
Test login. 
2.5.2 Change the Crowd’s port 
Crowd uses a default port of 8095. Figure 2.5.2 shows 8095 being used as the connector for http 
and it is the main port. This could be changed to a new port to make it less conspicuous and 
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thereby giving Crowd less changes of being attacked using this means. In addition, changing the 
crowd.url port, demo.url port, openidserver.url and running the build.xml script against the 
build.xml configuration file goes a long way in protecting Crowd[14]. 
 
Figure 2.5.2 Connectors configuration for http, Tomcat, Openid server and its main port. 
2.5.3 Spring security 
Spring Security
4
 is a powerful and high customizable authentication and authorization 
framework for J2EE applications. This approach enables Spring Security to handle the 
authentication and authorization requests to Crowd’s applications that supports it[15].  
2.5.4. Change all default passwords 
Users - both administrator and new user should change their passwords upon first logins. This is 
a good practice as it makes users utilize stronger and safer passwords. By default, after 
installation the passwords for Crowd - Openid-server, Crowd, Demo, and Username are all 
“password”. Easily guessable passwords like these are a threat to the security of Crowd and other 
applications [11]. 
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http://projects.spring.io/spring-security/ 
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2.5.5. Security updates installation 
Updates are vital to all applications as most consists of various problems they address. Some 
updates may just be bug fixes, security fixes or some additional features to the application. For 
most applications with vulnerabilities, security fixes are usually issued to address those issues 
and, these may sometimes come as a major update or a simple patch or hotfix.  
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3Analyse the different security solution options available 
To better understand how these security solutions would be applied to ESTCube-1’s Mission 
Control System (MCS), the system would be divided into levels with the components forming 
the levels, as seen in Figure 3 below. First things first, the components must be installedand the
 
Figure 3. Layer-by-layer implementation of security solutions revealing the levels and their 
components, having MSC secured in the middle. 
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necessary linkages between the components are made appropriately. For MCS to function well 
without hiccups, it is advisable to assume the following order for installation, running and 
implementation of the security solutions: Crowd > Mongodb > Oracle db> ActiveMQ > Jetty. 
Figure 3 illustrates the level-by-level security solutions implementation to be enforced, the 
alphabets A, B, C being the levels and the numbers 1, 2, 3 being the component’s number and 
direction. The full MCS in focus is not a secured system; it has security problems that needs 
urgent attention. It is only right to view the security problems from a broader perspective (the 
system as a whole), which also includes the various components that make up the system. Fixing 
these issues or implementing these security measures would be done in four levels starting from 
the basic security implementations and moving deeper to the core.  
LEVEL A – After installations of all the components, the first approach to ensuring a secure 
system would be to secure the network connection of components in level A, starting from 
numbers 1 through number 5. For Crowd it would be to change the connection port from default 
port to another one to make it unknown to others, and changing the default password, which 
would make its access controlable. Next would to configure Mongodb’s Network security, as 
well as to connect with SSL to ensure a secure connection to the database. For Oracle the 
Enhance security settings should be configured to ensure access control and also to enable 
Security configuration enhancement to manage the password parameters communication 
between Oracle clients and Oracle. The ActiveMQ would firstly be changed from its default port 
to hide it and then enable configuration of Certificate-based security to allow connection for 
ActiveMQ to be safe and secure from the beginning. Finally, Jetty first would change its default 
connection port and then implement SSL configuration that would provide secure connection 
from the start.  
LEVEL B – this level already have some protection and now would be to take the security up a 
notch by following the same numbering pattern. Crowd in this stage should be configured for 
Authentication and Authority to enable access control, also implementing Spring security 
configuration as a form of access control. The Mongodb now requires implementation of Access 
control in order to restrict activities to the database and implementing Kerberos authentication to 
do the same as Access control, just a tad safer. Oracle would be configured to enable Network 
security to secure connection to port and Data encryption of moving data to ensure the integrity 
40 
 
and confidentiality of the data in motion using the SSL protocol. Here in ActiveMQ, the 
configuration of Basic Authentication and Authorization mechanism should be done to control 
how the users can access it or LDAP authentication implementation as well doing similar thing 
but with more security. In Jetty, implementation of in-built Authentication and Authorization 
(Security Realm) mechanism or using one from JAAS configuration or Spnego authentication 
configuration for a safer and more reliable means.  
LEVEL C –The final level for Crowd would be the installation of application/security updates 
as soon as it is available. For Mongodb on this level would be to implement Data encryption as 
last stage of security and Audit system activities to know what is happening and had happened in 
the system. In Oracle, it would be to implement Data encryption of data at rest- for protecting 
the stored data form access ifit happens to be the final security option available, another one is to 
carry out Security updates installation, always. For ActiveMQ, install available security updates 
if/when available. Finally, for Jetty is to ensure the configuration of Web-Form limit for both 
webapps and server that would prevent influx of information to Jetty, which would cause denial 
of service attacks.  
3.1 ActiveMQ 
ActiveMQ’s default settings have little or no security protection in place and it is highly 
vulnerable to intrusions and attacks. Table in AppendixI below highlights the list of possible 
solutions to make ActiveMQ more secured. The first solution which is Authentication[2] has 
the benefit of being the simplest form of security to be applied, it is customizable and does 
support plug-ins. A big advantage is that it is a default feature but it still supports other third 
party products. The bad thing about it is that the user’s credentials are stored in plain-text format 
and this is not suitable for product or large systems. Authorization[2] on the other hand is easy 
to configure, supports JAAS configuration, has two levels of authorization and it does not 
depend on any transport protocol. The configuration files and credentials can be accessed easily 
from the system is a disadvantage. LDAP authentication[2] uses different technologies to 
authenticate and authorize users. Its support for SSL, its flexibility, support of plug-ins and being 
secure are good traits. The negative thing here is that it stores the directory locally and 
unprotected. Custom security plug-ins[2][16] might not be expensive, they are secure and 
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flexible-all good traits. They can take long time to build and can be complex depending on the 
amount of the codes involved. Certificate-basedsecurity[2][16]issafe and secure, commercial or 
private options to choose from, supports OpenSSL. The cons are that the commercial CA are 
costly, the private CA have trust issues with browsers, applications and Operating Systems. The 
self-signed certificate has maximum of one-year life span, is slower and uses low hash and 
cipher technology and has no support for advance PKI function. 
3.2 Jetty Web Server 
Jetty web server is an http sever and servlet container based on java used for adding network and 
web connectivity to java apps via set of JARS. A complete Jetty web server installation can be 
accessed, manipulated and controlled without permission because all settings and features are in 
their default states. Below are the measures to be put in place to ensure a secure Jetty web server 
as well as the good and the bad things associated with them. In AppendixII, the first solution, 
which is SSL configuration, provides Jetty with integrity, makes it trustworthy, confidential, 
encrypts data and authenticates target’s identity. SSL certificates expire, difficulties in 
installation, hinders performance and 100% protection not guaranteed-are some of the 
disadvantages of this solution. The setting up of Authentication and Authorization for Jetty 
proves to make it safer and secure. Some of its pros are the fact that there are many plug-ins 
supported, does not use a lot of memory, has large community, has LDAP support and encrypts 
data. The issues with this solution are that the page load time may slow down, adds pressure on 
sever and its complexity. Webapp form limit configuration is flexible, customizable and 
simple. These are the advantages of this solution. On the other hand, it is a nice place through 
which attackers can carry out a DOS. Secure password obfuscation provides confidentiality, 
protects passwords and secures access to Jetty. The disadvantages are the inability to easily 
change the used algorithm for the passwords and the results are irreversible. JAAS 
configuration is flexible, secure, supports LDAP and multiple plug-ins. Bad about this is that 
the credentials are locally stored and might not be encrypted which will lead to others being able 
to access them. Spnego configuration offers security based on the standard GSSAPI 
mechanism, supports three main browsers, LDAP and SSO support and it is flexible. 
Disadvantages are no support for remote access, restricted browser support and requires a good 
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knowledge to test and configure. If not set properly or a little mistake is made, the whole system 
would fail. 
3.3 Mongodb 
Mongodb is an open source NoSQL database solution with support for many platforms. Like 
most NoSQL databases, its default installation has minimal or no security implemented for use. 
In AppendixIIIare shownthe various security features to be implemented to make Mongodb more 
secured for use both in testing environment and in production environment. The very first feature 
in this list would be the SSL configuration, which provides secure connection over the internet 
for Mongodb. Its advantages are data encryption, secure communication,and that it can use many 
valid certificates and support for many language drivers. Its downside is that SSL does not come 
pre-installed and has performance issues when implemented. Refer to the table in Appendix III 
for more. Access control, which restricts or minimizes access to the database, would be the next 
in line to make a more secure Mongodb. The advantages are the control over the database and 
the restriction of unauthorized access. The bad news is that after installation there are no 
authentication and authorization. Installed databases have no password authentication and new 
created users have a read-only access to all databases. Kerberos authentication, which can as 
well be a part of the “access control” solution, has these pluses: it is industry’s standard, has 
support for Windows and Linux, is secure and supports many language drivers. The bad news is 
that there is no support for some older versions of Mongodb. Network security in this context 
contains the network filtering capabilities available in both Linux and Windows and the ability to 
allow SSL. Its advantages are secured communications, REST interface being disabled and 
support for Linux and Windows platforms. The Data encryption’s support for third party 
solution and encryption of sensitive data is a good factor. The disappointing factor is the fact that 
not the whole database can be encrypted and that it costs. Finally, the Audit system activities 
are very nice way of monitoring who had access to what operations and what activities took 
place. The good news is the knowledge of the operations going on in the database and the 
options to view these logs. The bad news is there is no syslog support for Windows, which is not 
a big deal though; also, this is for only the enterprise version of Mongodb.  
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3.4 Oracle database 
Oracle database is an object-oriented database management system built by Oracle Corporation 
that uses the relational database framework for accessing data through SQL. An Oracle database 
installation does have some default security features in place but these are not considered secure. 
AppendixIV shows some of security implementations that must be put in place to ensure a more 
secure Oracle database. The first one in this list is the Enhance security settings, which talks 
about the changing of default passwords that are included in the installation, control of users’ 
privileges and installation of only necessary components. Not to leave out authentication and 
authorization of users. This makes the database safer and it is a safe practice. Next is the 
Security updates installation. This is vital to the security of the database because it brings 
security fixes to bugs or backdoors. The security updates should be applied to the operating 
system also for better security on both levels. The sad news here is that some security fixes 
happen to be slow. The Data encryption will be encrypting data in motion and data at rest. The 
benefits of data in motion’s encryption are the support for encryption mechanisms like OAS, 
IPSEC, Stunnel and SSH Tunnelling. While that of data at rest are eCrypts, RMAN, 
DBMS_CRYPTO and TDE for column encryption as well as tablespaces. Its disadvantages are 
the weight it puts on the system, database and it takes time. OS authenticationmeans when the 
database allows authentication through the operating system.The good thing with it is that it is 
fast and time efficient but the bad thing with this is that it is not the safest form of authentication, 
while anyone with access to the machine can active do many things to the database. Security 
configuration enhancement deals with password parameters management to ensure a better and 
safer configuration for the database. Advantages of these tunings are good control over the 
access of the database, a safer database and knowing that better passwords are used for 
authentication. Network security entails the securing the network communication by encrypting 
the database’s connection using SSL, changing the listeners’ configurations as well as the 
tnsname configuration. The default connection ports must be changed too. Good about this is the 
knowing that the connections are only the approved ones and that the data are safe and secure. 
Bad is that the configuration can be confusing, which might be frustrating to users. 
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3.5 Crowd 
Crowd is an Atlassian product for managing SSO into various web applications. The security-
implemented features are shown in AppendixV. For Authentication and Authorization, Crowd 
uses LDAP technology, which is based on X.500 to bind the connection to a webapp user. The 
advantages of this authentication and authorization is the ease it delivers thanks to Active 
Directory and LDAP support, its access control and the one credential for multiple apps ability. 
Disadvantage is that credentials are stored locally in the directory. Changing Crowd’s ports is a 
way of making Crowd more secure. All the default ports are known by anyone with knowledge 
of Crowd and could be used in a bad way. Changing the ports makes the ports unknown to 
intruders and it makes Crowd hidden. Spring security configuration is another way to secure 
Crowd by authenticating and authorizing access to Crowd. The advantages are the customization, 
security and encryption it offers. The drawback is that it works over unprotected networks. 
Changing all default passwords upon initial logins is a good practice because most parameters 
use the default passwords after installation. The negative part is the passwords can be used to 
access Crowd. Application updates installation might be a fix for any vulnerability found in 
Crowd, or addition of more features. Advantages of installing updates are the ease of the 
procedure; it might increase performance and security, and fix old ones. The disadvantage is that 
updates might alter existing configurations and settings.  
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4Implementation of chosen solutions on MCS test environment 
4.1 Crowd 
 CHANGE CONNECTION PORTS 
Connection ports are changed from their default port number to a desired port by editing the 
build.properties file. Next is to change the server.xml file to match the one in the 
build.properties file.Figure 4.1A shows the default SSL port is changed from 8443 to 8444. 
 
Figure 4.1A. Shows a web browser with information on SSL configured in red rectangle, 
changed port number in blue rectangle and login process for a user in black rectangle 
 SSL CONFIGURATION 
SSL was configured in the server.xmlfile to use new connector port, SSL protocol, Keystore file 
and keystore password was provided. Figure 4.3.2 is the SSL configuration file in server.xml 
showing the connection port, SSL protocol, Keystore file and Keystore password. Figure 4.1B 
shows SSL being actively used in the web browser. 
 
Figure 4.1B. SSL configuration showing the connection port, SSL protocol, Keystore file and 
Keystore password. 
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 AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
Authentication is done when a user wants access to the webapp through the web browser. The 
user is asked to present valid login credentials, with which the user would be verified. Figure 
4.1A above shows a login realm for Crowd asking for a username and password. Authorization 
is done by assigning roles to a given user or group or given permissions. Figure 4.1C below 
shows how permissions are being taken away from users in a specific directory. This could be 
done in the group as well as with users.  
 
Figure 4.1C. Authentication done by checking or unchecking the boxes in the Permissions tab of 
a directory. 
 APPLICATION/SECURITY UPDATES INSTALLATION 
Security updates installation in Crowd are mainly offered through “Crowd Security Advisories 
and Fixes” channel. The page gives information on any vulnerabilities that was discovered in 
Crowd (as well asthe vulnerability’s severity, risk assessment and fix) and offers “Security 
Patches” if available, alternatively the solutions are in the form of application upgrades.  
4.2 Mongodb 
 NETWORK SECURITY 
A different connection port was chosen to run the Mongodb server (mongod) and client (mongo). 
As seen in Figure 4.2A, the red rectangle shows the non-default port chosen to run the server and 
the rest of the command line contains other parameter needed for running the server in a secure 
way.  
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Figure 4.2A. A non-default port chosen to run the server as indicated in the red rectangle. 
A Firewall (netsh Windows and Iptables for Linux) are used to configure limit from hosts to the 
system. Below in Figure 4.2B shows Mongodb connection port, Mongodb server and Mongodb 
client configured to be inside the Firewall, the red rectangles indicating outcome of the 
implementation and the blue rectangles show the rule names that are added. 
 
Figure 4.2B. The connection port, server and client configured to be inside the Firewall, the red 
rectangles indicates the status and blue rectangles shows the rule. 
Bind_ip was used to bind mongod and mongo the specific ip-addresses. While the Rest interface 
was disabled not to allow connection to server through a web browser. Figure 4.2C shows the 
mongodb.config file having the bind_ipin red rectangle and rest in blue rectangle as well as other 
commands 
 
Figure 4.2C. Mongodb.config file with bind_ip option in red rectangle and rest in blue rectangle 
and other commands. 
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 ACCESS CONTROL 
Authentication and Authorization: Authentication was done on the client end and it is shown in 
the server end. Figure 4.2D shows an authenticated user with the accompanying credentials in 
the server side after it was authenticated on the client side. Authorization was done on the user 
inside the database after being authenticated in the form of “roles” assigned to the user. 
 
Figure 4.2D. An authenticated user with accompanying credentials in the server side after it was 
authenticated on the client side, the “1” in the red rectangle indicates the user was successful. 
 DATA ENCRYPTION  
Data encryption for this version of Mongodb is not officially supported but there are some third 
party paid and Open Source options to supplement for that. Since encryption of the whole 
database is not supported, only parts can be done with the official one. For Windows, the 
available options are for encrypting the whole drive. TrueCrypt and BitLocker Drive encryption 
tools are used for full drive encryption. Depending on the version of Windows owned will 
determine if it would be available for use. For Linux there are Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS), 
Gazzang and MongoDirector.com. 
4.3 Oracle database 
 ENHANCE SECURITY SETTINGS  
On gaining access to Oracle, the first thing done was to check the accounts to see which ones 
have or are using a default password associated with them. Figure 4.3A below displays all users 
which have default password set, they are ordered by theirs various usernames and the 
“Account_status” being “Expired & Locked” as shown in the red rectangle[17]. 
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Figure 4.3A. Displays all the users with default passwords, they are ordered by theirs various 
usernames and the “Account_Status” being “Expired and Locked”. 
For the users’ account that is not in use or do not deserve certain privileges, the best thing to do 
is to remove or revoke its right to EXECUTE. In addition, some other means from which 
execution could take place are also revoked. As seen in Figure 4.3B showing privileges to the 
“Public” account stripped off its privilege to execute on certain channels. Only minimal or 
necessary privileges needed for getting jobs done should be granted to users[10]. 
 
Figure 4.3B. Shows privileges to the “Public” account stripped off its privilege to execute on 
certain channels. 
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Next is checking for users with default password using the query that selects the usernames and 
password from the dba_users. As shown in Figure 4.3C with the result returning “no rows 
selected” indicating no such users exists. 
 
Figure 4.3C. The result returning “no rows selected”, which is indicating no such users exists. 
When creating the database, the “Custom database” option was chosen for installation so that 
only the needed components could be installed. This allows you to unselect the unwanted 
components that by choosing the default installation would be installed. Figure 4.3D shows all 
the default components in the “Database Components” and clicking on the button “Standard 
Database Components” reveals all the “Standard Database Components”.  
 
Figure 4.3D. All the default components in the “Database Components” and clicking on the 
button “Standard Database Components” reveal all the “Standard Database Components”. 
 SECURITY CONFIGURATION ENHANCEMENT 
After checking the password parameters to see the default limits that exists, most of them were 
set to their default limit which is unlimited as seen in Chapter 2, Figure 2.4.5. The password 
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parameters are set to their respective values as shown below in Figure 4.3E, thus enforcing strict 
password parameter management for Oracle. 
 
Figure 4.3E.Password parameter management shows the changed parameter limits from their 
default state. 
 NETWORK SECURITY 
The default Oracle Listeners that comes installed shows its security being set to ON and can 
authenticate locally through the OS or by providing the listener’s password. This is safer as 
access to the listener is authenticated and can restrict unwanted access. In Figure 4.3F, the 
listener status showing its security as being “ON=Local OS Authentication” and “ON=Password 
or Local OS Authentication”, as well as its host and listening port. 
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Figure 4.3F. Listener status showing it security as being “ON=Local OS Authentication” and 
“ON=Password or Local OS Authentication”, as well as its host and listening port. 
Next is to instruct the listener not to accept set of commands from any other sources apart from 
the ones it is given by editing the listener’s configuration (listener.ora) file to include ADMIN _ 
RESTRICTIONS_LISTENER = ON. 
Change the listeners’ default password or simply change the old weak password to a new 
stronger one. This can either be done from the command prompt or using a GUI like that of 
Figure 4.3G 
 
Figure 4.3G. The listeners’ password being changed using the Oracle Network Configuration 
Manager GUI, as well as other parameters. 
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 CHANGE DEFAULT AND /OR UNUSED PORTS 
In addition to the security implemented in the listeners’, it is till advisable to change their default 
ports to something else to reduce the risk of attack by scanning for default and open ports.Most 
important ports to be changed are the Oracle Net Listener (1521) and the Oracle Net 
Listener/Enterprise Manager Repository (1526) ports. These are done by editing/changing the 
port number the listener.ora configuration file and restarting the listener. Method differs for 
others and is highly suggested to take ports from ranges 1521-1550 and 1600-1699for better 
protection. 
 DATA ENCRYPTION (MOTION DATA-SSL) 
After creating Wallets which contains the both the public-private key pairs using the Oracle 
Wallet Manger and/or OpenSSL
5
, the Certificates are then to imported into the Wallet and saved 
to its directory while allowing it to use “Auto login”. It would still require authentication though. 
Figure 4.3H shows the Wallet with various certificates and an overview of the Trusted 
Certificates’ parameters. Next, Oracle Net Configuration is opened and then Profiles and to the 
SSL tab where Credentials Configuration for both Server and Client are chosen. After this is 
done, the Network Configuration is saved and the Listers are reloaded and changes visible in 
listener.ora, sqlnet.ora and tnsname.ora files. Figure 4.3I reveals Oracle Net Configuration 
showing the setting up of SSL with Oracle advanced Security option. 
                                                 
 
 
5
https://www.openssl.org/ 
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Figure 4.3H. Wallet with all its certificates as well as a clear view of the Trusted Certificates’ 
parameters. 
 
 
Figure 4.3I. Oracle Net Configuration showing the setting up of SSL with Oracle advanced 
Security option. 
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 DATA ENCRYPTION (DATA AT REST)  
A master key is created for the Wallet that will enable open at anything when provided. This 
master key is then entered into the database with the “alter” command. Next, create a tablespace 
in the database and location of the Wallet’s credentials, the size and the encryption algorithm 
type with the “using” command. After that a check to see if went successfully is done as seen in 
Figure 4.3J showing the list of tablespaces that are encrypted. Encryption of Columns is done 
also since whole database encryption is not supported. 
 
Figure 4.3J. List of encrypted tablespaces. 
 SECURITY UPDATES INSTALLATIONS 
Installation of updates, which are critical to Oracle database are always issued when there are 
any discovered vulnerabilities. Critical Patch Updates
6
, as they are called, Security Alerts and 
Third Party Bulletins usually gives information about security vulnerabilities and if there are 
available fixes. This is available mostly for Oracle products’ customers who are having contract 
that can grab these fixes when out. 
 OS AUTHENTICATION BYPASS  
This is when the Authentication to Oracle database is done on the Operating System level. 
Bypassing it will give straight access to the database, a matter of creating a new user in 
Windows, adding the user to a group, adding the user to OS database operators and 
administrator, and finally addingos_authen_prefix= OPS$ to the user’s parameters and rebounce 
                                                 
 
 
6
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alerts-086861.html 
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the database. Figure 4.3K illustrates the sign-in process when the OS Authentication is bypassed. 
The database is authenticated using password credentials. Default settings will allow 
authentication simply by using the default sqlplus /. 
 
Figure 4.3K.The signing process when the OS Authentication is bypassed. The database is 
authenticated using password credentials. 
When a remote request is made to the node on the network, it contacts the Oracle*Net which 
decides if to trust it and map it to a database or not. Default setting of allowing remote connect to 
Oracle is reconfigured to require authentication. Figure 4.3L shows the system configuration 
with “remote_os_authent” set to “FALSE”, thus not allowing authentication request to the 
database from remote location.  
 
Figure 4.3L. System configuration showing “remote_os_authent” set to “FALSE”, this will not 
allow authentication request to the database from remote location. 
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4.4 ActiveMQ 
 CHANGE DEFAULT PORTS 
ActiveMQ allows default ports to be changed by assigning a new port number to the 
transportConnectorsetting in the activemq.xml configuration file, save it and restart the broker. 
Figure 4.4A shows ActiveMQ using a non-default port at start-up indicated by the red rectangle 
 
Figure 4.4A. Change to the connection port that ActiveMQ uses showing SSL connection 
running on a non-default port. 
 SSL CONFIGURATION 
Create a Keystore and Truststore to key the needed certificates. Generate a self-signed certificate 
for both the broker and the server; then export or copy them to the /conf/ folder and instruct the 
transportconnector in /activemq.xml file to use ssl and https while requesting the client to 
authenticate. Figure 4.4B shows the red rectangles with SSL and HTTPS connections made 
successfully with authentication set to true. The transport connector for HTTPS runs on port 
8443, while the ssl runs on port 61619 which it uses for web console. 
 
Figure 4.4B. SSL and HTTPS connections started successfully with clients required to 
authenticate before using. 
 AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION (SECURITY REALMS) 
Authentication for client is configured using the BasicAuthenticator with HashLoginService 
while while encrypting the passwordin the configuration file with StandardPBEStringEncryptor. 
Figure 4.4C shows ActiveMQRealm requesting a client to present credentials for it to be 
authenticated before access the webconsole running on the localhost server on port 8161.  
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Figure 4.4C. A client being presented with to present ActiveMQRealm demanding credentials 
for it to be authenticated before access to the webconsole running on the localhost server on port 
8161. 
 INSTALL SECURITY UPDATES 
Security updates for ActiveMQ are done by installing only the core .jar components files in 
order to keep configuration settings intact. While for internal security updates, the Keystore and 
Truststore to be updated with the newer keys if the old ones have expired or there issome 
security breach somewhere[18]. 
4.5 Jetty Web Server 
 CHANGE THE DEFAULT CONNECTION PORT 
The default connection port Jetty uses for connect can be changed in any of these two ways: 
When starting Jetty and from the configuration file. Default port Jetty runs on is port 8080 and 
has dedicated port for configuration of SSL 443. Figure 4.5A shows Jetty connection running on 
port 8181with the help of a jetty.port module when starting Jetty server.  
 
Figure 4.5A. Changing the default port for Jetty connection using the jetty.port module when 
starting Jetty server. 
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 SSL CONFIGURATION 
Default Jetty connects to the browser using the default HTTP protocol, which is old and not 
secure through port 8080. SSL configuration changes connections from HTTP to HTTPS 
through some configuration file tweaking. The keys and certificates are generated and signed, 
then later converted to a format, which Jetty understands - PKCS12. In Jetty, the pkcs12 
certificate is added to the Jetty’s keystore in the ~\etc\ folder where other configurations files are 
also located. The XML files configured for jetty-https.xml, jetty-spdy.xml and jetty-ssl. 
Passwords for the KeystorePassword, TruststorePassword, KeyManagerPassword and paths to 
the KeystorePath andTrustStorePassword are provided in the configuration file. Figure 4.5B 
shows Chrome and Firefox browsers running the server with SSL (https) protocol and the bottom 
shows Firefox browser warning against using that connection to the certificate presented. 
 
Figure 4.5B. Chrome and Firefox browsers running the Jetty server with SSL (https) protocol as 
well as the error message. 
 AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION (SECURITY REALM) 
Authentication to the webapp had to be put in place to protect it from access by anyone without 
due permission. For this to happen, the test application’s XML file in the ~\webapp\ folder has to 
be configured to make securityHandler use the HashLoginService and BASICAuthentication as 
the Authenticator. Other files like the realm.property, jetty.xml connected to the realms in the 
~\etc\ folder were also configured to match the rest configurations already done for the 
Authentication and Authorization. Figure 4.5C below is the Realm1 requesting the user to enter 
the necessary credentials for Authentication to gain access to the webapp. 
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Figure 4.5C. Firefox browser running the a test webapp via a secure connection and the realm 
“Realm1” requesting for Authentication credentials for access to the webapp. 
 FORM LIMIT FOR WEBAPPS AND SERVER 
The maximum size of Form Content the webapps and the server could or should take could be 
adjusted in the configuration files. The ~\etc\ folder contains the jetty.xml file in which these 
webapps and server parameter are changed. The MaxFormContentSize and MaxFormKeys 
attributes must be set to the wanted amount to maintain the security of the webapps and server as 
shown in Figure 4.5D. 
 
Figure 4.5D Form limits for webapps and server shows the attributes for MaxFormContentSize 
and MaxFormKeys changed according to desired security of both. 
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5 Test and verify the solution on MCS test environment 
Crowd – Crowd server ran well during the test with minimal or no errors. I would still 
recommend a longer test period to verify that all implemented solutions would stand the test of 
time. 
Mongodb- Mongodb has free and enterprise versions. The free version does not support SSL out 
of the box but could be configured to work with it by building Mongodb from source code with 
the help of some third party tools, as it was done in this project. Enterprise version comes with 
SSL support. I would highly recommend buying the enterprise version because of the reliable 
support it has and all other features bundled with it. During the testing period for SSL 
implementation, there was loss of communication due to a “could not negotiate SSL connection: 
EOF detected” after running the server for a while. I would recommend a longer test to identify 
the cause of this and find a fix. 
Oracle – Oracle database ran well with the solutions implemented. Although the implemented 
solutions being tested and verified are sufficient to secure the system, further testing would be 
recommended to ensure stability and reliability for the solutions. Also a good recommendation 
would be to purchase an enterprise edition due to the security support it offers. 
ActiveMQ–The test and verification on ActiveMQ was fine. It ran without errors for the short 
test period, longer test period is recommended. A stronger authenticator should be used as well. 
Jetty web server - For testing purpose Basic authenticator was used, it would be better to use a 
stronger authenticator in a production environment. I would also recommend increasing the form 
limit for test purposes to simulate an event of DOS attacks. That should verify its threshold and 
get you prepared for a worst case scenario. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this work was to provide a better security solution for ESTCube-1 Mission Control 
System. Currently, none of the components that were tested are running on default setting 
configuration any longer, thereby making them more secure than they were. In long run, the 
methods and solutions applied in this thesis ensure the security of the satellite operations.  
Based on the components, the vital results are as follows: 
 Connections between Crowd server and client are encrypted using SSL encryption while 
running on a non-default port; access to vital resources has been restrained by enforcing 
Authentication and Authorization; and finally, it was made sure that the technologies used 
are up-to-date security wise. 
 Mongodb server and clients were configured to run behind Firewall; the default connection 
port was changed; the server was restricted to accept communication from certain ip 
addresses, by binding; and Authentication and Authorization were enabled in the database; 
SSL was configured to secure the connection as well. 
 To initiate the security in Oracle database, the default passwords were changed and 
inactive/unused accounts were closed; password parameters were changed from their default 
limits; network communication was encrypted using SSL certificates stored in the Oracle 
Wallet; OS authentication bypass was disabled and database authentication enabled. 
 The ActiveMQ connection between client and broker was efficiently secured using SSL 
certificates; server connection port for listening and the port for client’s web console was 
changed; as well as Authentication and Authorization for client was enabled. 
 Jetty web server is now running on a non-default port; Jetty was configured to use SSL 
protocol to secure connection between server and webapp; security realm for Authentication 
and Authorization was configured; finally, Form Limit for both the server and webapp to 
minimize any chance of Denial of Service attacks was set. 
Future recommendations 
The work was done in MCS test environment for a limited amount of time and achieved these 
results. I would recommend a longer period for Testing and Verification to ensure that there are 
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less errors. When the results from the longer Testing and Verification proves to be with minimal 
errors, then the same security solutions should be implemented in the live environment of 
ESTCube-1 Mission Control System. 
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Appendix 
I. Security solutions for ActiveMQ 
ActiveMQ Pros Cons 
Authentication Simplicity, customizable, plug-in support, 
good for testing environment, comes 
default, LDAP support, fastest security 
solution 
Password stored in plain-text, not safe for 
large systems or production environment, 
Authorization Easy-of-use configuration file, JAAS 
support, LDAP authorization support, 
message-level authorization safer than 
operation-level authorization, 
independent of transport protocol () 
Configuration files can be easily accessed 
LDAP authentication SSL support, secure, flexible, ease-of-use, 
plug-ins support, also does authorization 
Credential can be accessed from directory 
Build custom security 
plug-ins 
Flexible, secure, might be cost friendly, 
encryption can be added 
Can be complex depending on the code, 
time consuming 
Certificate-based 
security 
Commercial CA are trusted, secure, 
versatile, fast 
Private CA is cheaper or free, OpenSSL 
support, no PKI needed, flexible 
Commercial CA are costly, 4 years life span  
Private CA cannot be trusted by other 
application/OS, limited to max 1 year use, 
may be slower, use low hash and cipher 
technology, not trusted by all browsers, no 
support for advanced PKI function 
II. Security solutions for Jetty Web Server 
Jetty Web Server Pros Cons 
SSL configuration Trust worthy, integrity, confidentiality, encrypts 
data, authenticates target’s identity 
SSL certificate expires after some time, 
requires payment, installation 
difficulties, performance issues, 
absolute security not guaranteed 
(OpenSSL’s “Heartbleed bug” [18] 
Authorization and 
authorization 
Multiple plug-ins support, encrypts data, 
flexible, safe, secure when great plug-ins are 
implemented, small memory footprint, stability, 
scalability, standard and community support 
[19] LPDAP support  
Slow page load time, pressure on 
server, 
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Jetty Web Server Pros Cons 
Webapp form limit 
configuration 
Customization form, flexible, Prevent DOS 
attacks 
Use vast amount of memory and CPU, 
DOS attacks point if not limit not set 
Secure password 
obfuscation 
Protects password from viewing, confidentiality, 
can be easily copied to another location when 
needed 
Result is irreversible, changing 
algorithm is a problem when changes 
are to be carried out 
JAAS configuration Flexibility, LDAP support [20] , secure Credential can be stored locally, 
Spnego 
configuration 
Supports Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome 
browsers, single password, secure, LDAP 
support, flexibility [3] 
No remote connection access, works on 
MS supported browsers only, requires 
Active Directory, requires vast amount 
of knowledge to configure and test, 
setup can easily fail,  
III. Security solutions for Mongodb 
Mongodb Pros Cons 
SSL 
configuration 
 Secure connections, encrypts data, can use 
any valid certificate, supports many 
programming language drivers, [21] 
Does not ship with SSL, SSL certificate 
expires after some time, requires payment, 
installation difficulties, performance issues, 
absolute security not guaranteed[18] 
Access control Restrict unauthorized access, control over the 
database 
No default authentication and authorization in 
place, 
Kerberos 
authentication 
for Mongodb 
Industry standard-good, Windows and Linux 
support, support for many language drivers, 
secure,  
No support for older versions,  
Network 
security 
Secure communication, same procedures in 
Windows and Linux, filter connection to 
database, REST interface not secure-disabled 
[6] 
Not straight-forward configuration procedures, 
no authentication for REST interface ,  
Data 
encryption 
Sensitive data encrypted, support for 3
rd
 party 
encryption solutions,  
Not whole database can be encrypted, costly,  
Audit system 
activities 
Many viewing options, gives knowledge of 
all operations and activities [22] 
No syslog support for Windows, Mongodb 
Enterprise only,  
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IV. Security solutions for Oracle database 
Oracle database Pros Cons 
Enhance security 
settings 
Safe practice, initial security in place,  Might be bad for some components that 
needs other components to function fully 
Security updates 
installation 
Makes both the database and OS secure,  Some fixes are slow to happen,  
Data encryption Many encryptions supported, data is 
secure,  
Time consuming, only available for some 
editions, not a lot of options available, only 
file-level encryption available,  
OS authentication 
bypass 
Fast, time efficient,  Not safe for authentication, easy to get 
access to,  
Security 
configuration 
enhancement 
Safer database, control over activities, 
remove default settings, better password 
usage 
Might be frustrating for users,  
Network security Secure the port for connection, control the 
listener and tnsname configuration files,  
Access to the configuration files can be 
easy,  
V. Security solutions for Crowd. 
Crowd Pros Cons 
Authentication and 
authorization 
LDAP support, not too complicated,  Stored credentials locally,  
Change Crowd’s 
ports 
Makes alternative ports unknown, gives 
protection,  
 
Spring security 
configuration  
Customizable, secure Can work over unprotected network 
Change all default 
passwords 
Safer Default passwords can be guessed easily  
Application updates 
installation 
Addresses old security issues, easy to 
apply, increase performance  
Might make changes in configuration 
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